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Transitioning From GILTI to FDII? Foreign Branch Income Issues
by Jeffery M. Kadet and David L. Koontz
Jeffery M. Kadet was in private practice for
over 32 years, working in international taxation
for several major international accounting
firms. He now teaches international tax courses
in the LLM program at the University of
Washington School of Law in Seattle. David L.
Koontz is a retired CPA who spent 25 years
working in the United States and Asia as a tax
partner in a major accounting firm. Later he
was involved with international transactions,
including raising capital from multiple sources
and using it in public and private companies
worldwide.
In this article, Kadet and Koontz explain the
risks and benefits multinationals must consider
in deciding whether to transition some
operations conducted within a controlled
foreign corporation (along with the associated
income) into a domestic group member to
achieve a structure that qualifies for foreignderived intangible income.
Copyright 2019 Jeffery M. Kadet and
David L. Koontz.
All rights reserved.
As many tax practitioners know, the Tax Cuts
and Jobs Act included several provisions focused
on foreign income, foreign deductions, tax credits,
and rules to curtail abuses connected with
businesses having some type of foreign
component. By now the new rules have been the
subject of many articles in tax and economic
journals. But this new law has much in common
with prior law — it is complicated, relies heavily
on complex definitions, and is likely to prove
difficult to apply. The complexities introduced
into the law require time-consuming analyses to
understand its effects and identify opportunities
so that taxpayers, both large and small, can benefit
from the law’s new provisions.
The purpose of this article is narrow in scope
and considers what is needed to better understand

the benefits and risks associated with a transition
from global intangible low-taxed income to
foreign-derived intangible income.
Congress provided a new 37.5 percent
deduction (21.875 percent for tax years beginning
after December 31, 2025) for FDII that is effectively
an export subsidy for products and services. This
subsidy is an apparent effort to expand exports,
thereby encouraging U.S. jobs and retaining
intangible property in, or encouraging its return
to, the United States. How does this subsidy,
which requires that income be recorded within
U.S. corporations, relate to typical international
structures used by multinationals that commonly
record income within controlled foreign
corporations?
1
As background, in a recent article, Benjamin
M. Willis described FDII and GILTI as two
separate regimes, despite the respective
deductions for both being in section 250. He states,
in part:
FDII and global intangible low-taxed
income are separate and distinct. They can
and will apply to different taxpayers.
While integrally related because of common
structural and definitional features, these new
provisions each target different taxpayers. As
Willis states, FDII functions as an export subsidy.
And consistent with this, the FDII rules apply only
to some “foreign-derived” income reported by
domestic corporations and explicitly prohibit any
2
benefit from foreign branch income earned by
those corporations. In contrast, GILTI concerns
only income recorded by foreign corporations that
1

Willis, “GILTI as Charged: FDII Regulations Prove Harmful Tax
Export Subsidy,” Tax Notes, Mar. 25, 2019, p. 1481. Willis explains that
section 250 could be seen as creating an illegal export subsidy, and how
the deductions for FDII and GILTI under that section are two distinct
regimes.
2

Section 250(b)(3)(A)(i)(VI).
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are CFCs. Under these provisions, the GILTI
income inclusion imposed on specified U.S.
3
shareholders, along with its accompanying 50
percent deduction (falling to 37.5 percent for tax
years beginning after December 31, 2025)
applicable to corporate U.S. shareholders and
4
electing individuals, creates an effective
minimum tax on that CFC income.
Not only are there different taxpayer targets,
the applicable IRC provisions indicate that FDII
and GILTI apply to different transactions and
businesses. Thus, a domestic corporation will
only receive FDII benefits from qualifying
transactions conducted through that corporation’s
U.S. offices. In the case of GILTI, it applies only to
a CFC’s income that is earned through its
operations conducted outside the United States.
This is because any CFC income that is earned
through a trade or business within the United
States and that constitutes effectively connected
5
income will be directly taxed in the hands of the
CFC at 21 percent. Any such ECI is excluded from
GILTI treatment.
These FDII-GILTI differences mean that if a
domestic corporation and a CFC were to each
conduct a specific transaction in the same manner
through efforts of the same personnel in the same
location, that transaction could not qualify both in
the hands of the domestic corporation for the FDII
deduction and also in the hands of the CFC as
tested income within the GILTI calculation. This
“same manner,” “same personnel,” and “same
location” comparison is relevant because of the
ease with which a multinational can arrange a
check-the-box election for any CFC, thereby
converting that entity from a CFC into a
disregarded entity treated as a branch or division
6
of the CFC’s U.S. owner.
For example, assume that X, a CFC wholly
owned by its corporate U.S. shareholder (USP),
sources product P through unrelated contract
manufacturers and sells this product P to foreign

3

“U.S. shareholders” as defined in section 951(b).

4

See part IV of the “Explanation of Provisions” in REG-104464-18,
released March 4, and prop. reg. section 1.962-1(b)(1)(i)(B)(3).
5
6

Sections 882 and 864(c).

The tax considerations that might arise from any check-the-box
election, such as potential taxation of appreciated property, are beyond
the scope of this article.
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customers through efforts of X’s personnel located
within an office it maintains outside the United
States. Assume that X is not engaged in any trade
or business within the United States, meaning that
X has no ECI. In this case, the income and
expenses related to these product P sales would
7
be included in net CFC tested income. Thus, and
ignoring the effect of any qualified business asset
investment and assuming zero foreign taxes, USP
would include in its income an appropriate
amount of GILTI and be allowed a 50 percent
section 250 deduction, thereby achieving a
beneficial 10.5 percent tax rate.
Now assume all facts for USP and X remain
8
the same except that a check-the-box election had
been made to cause X to be a disregarded entity of
USP. Because of this election, all of X’s income,
expenses, assets, and personnel are treated as
belonging to USP for U.S. tax purposes. Because X
personnel within X’s foreign office are responsible
for generating the product P sales, no FDII
deduction would be available under section 250
for these sales. That is because these sales are
attributable to a foreign branch of USP, the profits
of which are excluded from deduction-eligible
income, which is part of the base for the 37.5
9
percent FDII deduction.
Structures Obfuscating Income Generation
10

In prior articles we have postulated how
some multinationals manage and direct their

7
8

Defined in section 951A(c).
Reg. section 301.7701-3(c).

9

See section 250(b)(3)(A)(i)(VI) and (a)(1)(A). See also prop. reg.
section 1.904-4(f). Throughout this article, this exclusion from the FDII
benefit for foreign branch income is referred to as the “foreign branch
rule.” Note that for a foreign branch to exist for these purposes, section
989(a) and reg. section 1.989(a)-1 require that there must be a trade or
business and the branch must maintain separate books and records.
With this article focusing on disregarded entities, these two factual
requirements should normally be met, but confirmation of this will be
necessary.
10

Jeffery M. Kadet, “Attacking Profit Shifting: The Approach
Everyone Forgets,” Tax Notes, July 13, 2015, p. 193; Thomas J. Kelley,
David L. Koontz, and Kadet, “Profit Shifting: Effectively Connected
Income and Financial Statement Risks,” 221 J. Acct. 48 (Feb. 2016); Kadet
and Koontz, “Profit-Shifting Structures and Unexpected Partnership
Status,” Tax Notes, Apr. 18, 2016, p. 335; Kadet and Koontz, “ProfitShifting Structures: Making Ethical Judgments Objectively, Part 1,” Tax
Notes, June 27, 2016, p. 1831; Kadet and Koontz, “Profit-Shifting
Structures: Making Ethical Judgments Objectively, Part 2,” Tax Notes,
July 4, 2016, p. 85; Kadet and Koontz, “Internet Platform Companies and
Base Erosion — Issue and Solution,” Tax Notes, Dec. 4, 2017, p. 1435; and
Kadet and Koontz, “Effects of the New Sourcing Rule: ECI and Profit
Shifting,” Tax Notes, May 21, 2018, p. 1119.
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worldwide businesses from within the United
States, and to some extent may operate those
businesses within the United Sates. Then through
profit-shifting structures that involve both
intercompany service agreements and transfers or
licenses of intangible property to zero- or lowtaxed foreign group members, these foreign
group members record considerable income that
is not taxable within the United States. In doing
so, these multinationals either take the position or
fail to consider that such income might be ECI
directly taxable in the hands of these foreign
group members or that relevant income might be
caught by subpart F when an applicable foreign
group member is a CFC.
One of the articles11 included as examples
situations in which sales to major customers and
resellers or sales made through internet sales
platforms involved little or no sales activity
conducted through an office of the foreign group
member outside the United States. Rather, the
sales activities were conducted to a significant
extent by U.S.-based personnel, either directly
with such major customers and resellers or
indirectly through management and decisionmaking on product offerings, pricing, and
contract terms. U.S.-based personnel actively
managed and maintained on a day-to-day basis
the internet sales platforms, and made product,
pricing, and other operational decisions. Another
example in the article focused on service revenue
earned through internet platforms that involved
little or no revenue-generating activities outside
the United States. That revenue included
advertising charges for ads directed at website
users, fees for statistical and other information
about users, charges for specified cloud services,
and commissions from the sale or rental of thirdparty-owned applications, music, television
shows, movies, or books.
In those situations, typically the zero- or lowtaxed foreign group member (including its
disregarded entity subsidiaries) obtains necessary
support from U.S. group members through
intercompany service or similar agreements. With
the U.S. group members ostensibly acting as

independent contractors, the sales and other
revenue-generating activities performed within
the United States are arguably not attributed to
the foreign group member. This sort of structure
has the effect of obfuscating which group member
generates revenue, and where activities that
12
generate profits actually take place.
Why Significant for FDII and GILTI Planning
With the complexity of FDII and GILTI and
final regulations not expected until mid-2019 or
13
later (to say nothing of the potential for
legislative changes), most multinationals may be
hesitant to execute any restructuring that could
change income taxable under one regime into
income that would instead be covered by the
other regime.
For example, using the USP/X illustration
above, the group could transform transactions
currently executed by X that generate GILTI by
restructuring so that future product P sales are
made by USP. This could be done alternatively by
contractually changing the selling entity from X to
USP, or by merely checking-the-box to make X a
disregarded entity subsidiary of USP, provided,
however, that care is taken to ensure that the
foreign branch rule prohibiting FDII benefits
would not apply. To avoid application of the
foreign branch rule, the group would have to
physically move certain sales activities and other
key functions out of X’s foreign office and place
them into USP’s U.S. offices. If these sales
activities and other key functions remain in X’s
office outside the United States, the foreign
branch rule would prevent any FDII benefit.
Over past decades, many multinationals
implemented tax-motivated structures that
involved the transfer of intangible property into
zero- and low-taxed foreign group members, but
with little or no operational changes. These
structures relied on the foreign location of the
intangible property and intercompany service
and other agreements to contractually support

12

11

Kadet, “Attacking Profit Shifting,” supra note 10. See in particular
examples 4 and 6 regarding product sales. See also Example 7 regarding
non-sales revenue earned through internet platforms.

See Kadet and Koontz, “Profit-Shifting Structures and Unexpected
Partnership Status,” supra note 10, for specific discussion on how those
intra-group relationships may be a partnership for U.S. tax purposes,
thereby causing relevant foreign group members to be engaged in a
trade or business within the United States under section 875(1).
13

Final GILTI regs were released on June 14, 2019, in T.D. 9866.
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recording profits in these zero- and low-taxed
foreign group members that would otherwise
have been recorded in the United States or other
high-tax jurisdictions. With the advent of the new
territorial tax system and its section 245A
dividends received deduction, along with GILTI
and its less-than-21 percent effective tax rate, it
would almost always make sense to simply
continue those existing pre-TCJA profit-shifting
structures. However, uncertainties are created for
CFCs and their U.S. shareholders from issues such
as the severely limited foreign tax credit
applicable to GILTI and the effect of allocated
expenses on the GILTI category FTC limitation.
Thus, it will often make sense to consider whether
FDII might be a more beneficial alternative.
A first question for any multinational is
whether restructuring to eliminate GILTI and
achieve FDII status is possible. In this regard, it
was noted above that a multinational would have
to physically move key activities and functions
out of foreign offices and into the United States to
avoid the foreign branch rule. As a practical
matter, in implementing any tax planning or new
structure multinationals may want to minimize
required operational changes. Thus, when a CFC
is earning its profits through real activities and
functions conducted in its offices outside the
United States, those activities and functions must
be moved into the United States; that may be
operationally difficult to achieve. Or, for other
good business reasons, management might
simply veto any restructuring that would require
meaningful operational changes.
In setting up their profit-shifting structures
(that is, recording profits in zero- and low-taxed
group members), some multinationals appear to
have made few if any operational changes. That
was possible because the new structures often
required only a licensing or ownership transfer of
intangible property and intercompany service
agreements, often priced on a cost-plus basis. This
type of planning allowed most real functions to
remain within the group members that had
historically conducted them.
Now let’s consider using a check-the-box
election for a CFC so that its U.S. corporate owner
would directly report the assets and results of the
former CFC after the election. Assume that the
CFC has been part of a profit-shifting structure in

60

which the principal activities and functions that
generated the CFC’s income remained in the
United States with no such functions being
conducted by the CFC or its disregarded entity
subsidiaries. When the check-the-box election is
made for the CFC, there should not be any need to
make significant operational changes to obtain
FDII benefits because the foreign offices do not
conduct the key activities that generate income.
Thus, if a multinational in this situation pursues
FDII benefits in place of the section 245A
dividends received deduction and the low
effective rate of tax on GILTI, it should normally
be easy to transform such a profit-shifting
structure by merely checking the box for that
CFC. Likely, little if any operational changes
would be required because there should be few if
any activities in foreign offices that would bring
the foreign branch rule into play.
Assume in such a case that our CFC and its
disregarded entity subsidiaries performed only
support or auxiliary functions (for example,
warehousing and customer support) outside the
United States in connection with the sale of
products. To protect against the possibility after
the check-the-box election is made that the foreign
branch rule could be asserted (that is, potentially
causing related sales and service income items to
be excluded from deduction-eligible income and
thus not part of the base for FDII benefits), the
multinational might restructure these activities so
that they are done by other CFCs or are farmed
out to third parties. In either case, service or
similar agreements could be put in place to
contractually arrange for these services. (Note
that this paragraph and the following one cover
transactions between a U.S. group member and
other taxpayers (that is, group CFCs or third
parties). This contrasts with the discussion in the
subsequent two paragraphs that discuss
disregarded transactions between a U.S. group
member and its foreign branches, including
disregarded entities.)
Given the apparent intent of the foreign
branch rule to encourage activities and
employment within the United States, future IRS
audit activity could target structures that
artificially avoid foreign branch treatment
through intercompany agreements with group
CFCs. When only typical support and auxiliary
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functions are performed outside the United
States, there should not be an issue. However,
when the use of such agreements covers critical
business functions conducted by group CFCs,
including, for example, customer negotiations,
sales functions, or production activities, the IRS
may find an unacceptable circumvention of the
foreign branch rule. This could be the likely
outcome when a foreign group member has wideranging authority to act on behalf of a U.S. group
member, thereby causing that foreign group
member to be a de facto agent of the U.S. group
member. Those activities would then be held to be
the activities of the U.S. group member, thereby
creating a foreign branch through which the
relevant income is generated. As discussed earlier
in this article, such contractual structuring often
obfuscates where activities and functions are
really performed and where income is
economically earned.
If a multinational chooses, these support and
auxiliary functions may continue to be performed
by its former CFC (for which the check-the-box
election has been made) or its disregarded entity
subsidiaries in locations outside the United States.
After that election, the U.S. corporate owner of the
former CFC is required to treat as foreign branch
income (which must be excluded from deductioneligible income) only the income that reasonably
relates to these functions. There could be, for
example, service or other similar agreements
between the U.S. corporate owner, which earns
the gross income that qualifies for FDII benefits,
and the disregarded entity (the former CFC,
including its disregarded entity subsidiaries),
which performs the support or auxiliary
functions. Service fees computed on a cost-plus
basis may often be supportable. Although these
service and other similar agreements would
generally be disregarded transactions for U.S. tax
purposes, the applicable regulation concerning
foreign branch income generally respects such
agreements in determining the respective gross
incomes of the foreign branch and the branch
14
owner.
For support, auxiliary, or other functions
performed in offices outside the United States by

14

See prop. reg. section 1.904-4(f)(2)(vi).

the former CFC, there is an antiabuse rule that
covers efforts to artificially undervalue the
contributions and value of the foreign branches,
thereby overstating the FDII benefits. Specifically,
the proposed regulations giving FTC guidance
(REG-105600-18), issued November 28, 2018,
provide an antiabuse rule for the re-attribution of
gross income between foreign branches and their
owners. Although included in prop. reg. section
1.904-4(f)(2)(v) that generally concerns the FTC,
this antiabuse rule is expressly applicable to
inappropriately recorded items of gross income if
a principal purpose is avoiding the purposes of
section 250. The antiabuse rule is broadly written
stating: items of gross income “must be attributed
to one or more foreign branches or the foreign
branch owner in a manner that reflects the
substance of the transaction.” Prop. reg. section
1.904-4(f)(2)(vi)(E) also provides that disregarded
payments between a foreign branch and its owner
must reflect section 482 intercompany pricing
principles.
Risks Already Present
One situation discussed previously involved
the transition of an existing profit-shifting
structure into an FDII-qualifying structure. It was
noted that in some cases relevant sales,
production, and other important functions may
have been conducted in the United States. When
this is the case, the sought-after FDII benefits
should not be reduced or eliminated by the
foreign branch rule. However, while the transition
may be easy to execute with no significant
operational changes required, the transition itself
may highlight potential tax risks for pretransition
years. This risk will understandably be of interest
to the IRS, the boards and managements of
multinationals, and their investors, who should
be made aware of any significant tax risks of the
companies in which they invest.
As to how a transition to obtain FDII benefits
might highlight potential tax risks, assume that a
U.S. corporation (Parent) wholly owns a CFC
subsidiary (Sub) that sells products to two
categories of foreign customers. Parent, from its
business locations within the United States, is
largely responsible for soliciting, negotiating, and
maintaining relationships with major foreign
customers and resellers, which represent Sub’s
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first customer category. Sub also sells directly to
foreign consumers worldwide (the second
category) through an online platform with Parent
personnel managing and operating the platform
on a day-to-day basis. For these two categories of
product sales, Sub and its disregarded entity
subsidiaries perform only limited local logistics
and customer support outside the United States.
Assume that Parent makes a check-the-box
election for Sub to cause a loss of CFC status and
Sub becomes a disregarded entity treated as a
branch or division of Parent. This transition,
which required little or no operational changes to
move functions out of foreign offices and into the
United States, simply highlights the extent to
which Sub performed few key activities but
earned substantial profits in years before the
transition. Because the key income-earning
functions were conducted in the United States, the
prior arrangement may subject the CFC to
significant U.S. tax exposure. Upon audit of the
pretransition years, the IRS may find that Parent
was in fact conducting the Sub’s business, albeit as
a putative independent contractor under an
intercompany service agreement. When the facts
warrant it, the IRS may assert that Sub in those
pretransition years was engaged in a trade or
business in the United States, thereby causing any
ECI to be directly taxable in the hands of Sub.15
This example involves product sales. The
same issue will be especially acute for many
internet platform multinationals that earn service
revenue from advertising, user data, cloud
services, or selling or renting the products of third
parties. Assume that a CFC earning such revenue
relies on its U.S. group members for the day-today management and operation of the group’s
internet platform, including decision-making on
terms and pricing. For some significant portion of
the CFC’s revenue, advertisers and other users
will access the platform online without any
involvement of the CFC’s personnel (including
those of any disregarded entity subsidiaries).
Further, while tangible product deliveries may
involve some local warehousing and logistics,
many if not most advertisers and users access

services online and typically require no customer
support from locally based personnel. (An
exception to this will sometimes be found when
an internet platform multinational locally solicits
and services major customers.) Again, when the
facts warrant it, there may be considerable risk to
the CFC of being directly taxable on its ECI in
years before the transition.
It was noted earlier that multinationals may
be hesitant to transition to FDII structures from
their current structures that maximize profits
within their zero- and low-taxed foreign group
members. One multinational that has not been
hesitant to do so is Qualcomm, which announced
that it had made check-the-box elections for
several of its foreign subsidiaries. In a release
issued January 30, the company announced, in
part:
As a result of the Tax Legislation, in the
first quarter of fiscal 2019, several of our
foreign subsidiaries made tax elections to
be treated as U.S. branches for federal
income tax purposes effective beginning
in fiscal 2018 and fiscal 2019.
As a result, substantially all of our income
is in the U.S. and qualifies for the
preferential FDII tax rate, and the impact
of GILTI and BEAT [base erosion and
antiabuse tax] are negligible.
In its disclosure, the company made no
mention of any operational changes that
accompanied the check-the-box filings. An article
in The Wall Street Journal noted:
Qualcomm’s tax savings . . . were
generated without necessarily moving
any actual operations. Qualcomm made
what’s known as a “check the box”
election on its tax forms, reclassifying
several subsidiaries from controlled
foreign corporations into branches of the
U.S. company.16
Recognizing that operational changes might
be important, the journalist inquired and reported
that:

15

See discussion of this in the articles listed in supra note 10. In
particular, note the discussion in Section II of Kadet and Koontz, “Effects
of the New Sourcing Rule: ECI and Profit Shifting.”
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16

Richard Rubin, “Qualcomm Tax Move Will Save Firm $570
Million,” The Wall Street Journal, Jan. 30, 2019.
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Qualcomm wouldn’t say whether the
company moved any jobs or investments
in conjunction with the shift.
We have no knowledge of Qualcomm’s
internal operations and do not speculate on what
operational or other changes, if any, the group
may have made to avoid any detrimental effect
from the foreign branch rule. We also have no
knowledge of Qualcomm’s pre-check-the-box
structure that allowed profits to be recorded by its
CFCs. We merely present this as an example of
how a transition to an FDII-qualifying structure
may highlight a need to review prior operations
for potential ECI in pretransition years.
Effect of Transition on BEAT
Interestingly, the TCJA BEAT regime seems to
have had little effect on profit-shifting structures
that involve outbound intangible property
licensing and other intangible property transfers.
The reason is that such structuring does not
normally involve any of the outbound payments
that are the principal target of the BEAT. If
anything, such structuring involves inbound
payments because the foreign group members
holding intangible property rights and earning
revenue from customers must pay for the support
that U.S. group members provide under
intercompany service and similar agreements.
This situation, of course, will change upon any
transition to an FDII structure. This is because the
U.S. taxpayer earning the FDII-qualifying income
may have to make outbound service fee and other
deductible payments to foreign group members
acting as independent contractors. For example, a
U.S. group company earning sales revenue from
selling products to foreign customers may pay
foreign group members for logistical support or
warranty services that must be performed locally.
Finally, with the 3 percent “cliff” of section
59A(e)(1)(C) and the potential additional tax costs
of base erosion tax benefits, any multinational
contemplating a transition to achieve FDII
benefits should carefully consider how its BEAT
status might be affected by any increase in
outbound related-party payments occasioned by
the new structure.

Conclusion
It isn’t easy to determine whether a
multinational should transition to an FDIIqualifying structure from a structure that involves
recording profits in zero- or low-taxed foreign
group members. With the need to assure that the
FDII foreign branch rule is not violated, it may be
necessary to move some key income-earning
operations and functions to the United States.
Multinationals that try to avoid operational
changes through intercompany service and
similar agreements must give careful attention to
any potential for running afoul of the foreign
branch rule. Further, when few if any substantial
income-earning operations have been conducted
outside the United States in pretransition years,
an overall analysis may highlight a tax exposure
for unreported ECI. Finally, such a transition
could increase outbound related-party payments,
thereby affecting the multinational’s position
regarding the BEAT.
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